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I.

INTRODUCTION

In November of 2012, after a car chase, Cleveland police officers fired
137 shots at the suspects’ vehicle. 1 An investigation revealed that thirteen
officers fired more than 100 shots in the span of eight seconds. 2 One officer,
Michael Brelo, stood on the hood of the suspects’ vehicle and fired at least
Ben Larson, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022. The author is a third-year law student as part of
Mitchell Hamline’s blended learning program.
Eliott C. McLaughlin, 6 Cleveland Police Officers Fired for Actions in Fatal 2012 Chase,
CNN (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/us/cleveland-police-officers-firedchase/index.html [https://perma.cc/R86T-HMTR].
‡
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fifteen shots through the windshield at close range. 3 Both individuals in the
vehicle, Timothy Russell and Malissa Williams, were killed. Russell and
Williams “were both homeless with a history of mental illness and drug
use,” and fled after an officer attempted to pull them over for a turn signal
violation. 4 Brelo, who allegedly fired a total of forty-nine of the shots in the
incident, said that he thought he and his partner were in danger. 5 The source
of this belief, according to prosecutors, was a backfiring engine that officers
mistook for gunshots. 6 Russell and Williams were both unarmed. 7
Ultimately, the city attempted to fire six of the officers involved. 8 But
the terms of the Cleveland police union contract allowed each officer the
opportunity to challenge any termination to a third-party arbitrator who
would then issue a final, binding decision. 9 This arbitration clause also
allowed the arbitrator expansive authority to relitigate any determinations
made during earlier disciplinary proceedings. 10 After the arbitrations for the
six fired officers, the assigned arbitrator “ordered the city to rehire five of
the six officers involved in the deadly shooting, over the fierce objections of
city leaders.” 11 Officer Brelo was the only officer whose termination stood. 12
Today, most police officers are represented by unions and covered by
collective bargaining agreements. 13 While the terms and structures of these
agreements vary widely, they almost always permit officers to appeal
disciplinary actions to immediate superiors and, if they still wish to dispute
the disciplinary decision, to a neutral arbitrator. 14
Although studies on the subject are limited in scope, the studies
available suggest that “neutral arbitrators regularly overturn police
discipline.” 15 More controversial, however, is the role of these arbitrators in
3
4
5
6

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 560 (2019).
Id.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.
Id.
McLaughlin, supra note 1.
Tyler Adams, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does it Take to
Fire a Bad Cop?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 135 (2017) (“The likelihood of police
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

officers being covered by a collective bargaining agreement increases with the size of the city
in which the department is located. In 2013, 92% of police officers serving a population of
1,000,000 people or more had collective bargaining agreements, compared to slightly less
than 60% of officers serving populations of fewer than 2,500 people.”).
Id. at 135–36; see Rushin, supra note 7, at 571–73.
Adams, supra note 13, at 136–37 (“One study of Chicago police discipline arbitration
decisions from 1990 and 1993 found that arbitrators overturned about half of the total days
of disciplinary suspension imposed by police executives. A similar study of Houston police
discipline arbitration awards from 1994 to 1998 found that arbitrators upheld slightly more
than half of all suspension days.”).
14
15
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situations where the officer was discharged as opposed to disciplined in a
manner that allows them to ultimately retain their position. In his work on
the issue, Tyler Adams notes that,
A 2001 study of police discharge grievances in Cincinnati, for
example, observed how high standards for terminating police
officers resulted in many officers being reinstated. In recent years,
Philadelphia and Oklahoma City have seen nearly every
discharged police officer reinstated through arbitration. A study
of police discipline in Oakland between 2010 and 2014
characterized the arbitration system as “broken” because police
officials were upheld only about a quarter of the time. 16
Considering the widespread availability of arbitration to police officers
in challenging disciplinary decisions, the propensity of those arbitrations to
overrule the determinations of police chiefs, mayors, or other disciplinary
bodies, and the binding nature of arbitrator awards, arbitration constitutes a
massive obstacle to enforcing disciplinary decisions against law
enforcement.
Minnesota is not uniquely immune to these arbitration concerns.
Following arbitration, Minnesota officers have been reinstated after
discharge despite having kicked unarmed suspects already on the ground
being attacked by a police dog, repeatedly punched intoxicated individuals
in the face, and committed various dishonest acts in performing their
duties. 17 Similar to the pattern seen in other states and cities, about half of
Minnesota officers who have fought discharge actions in arbitration over the
last twenty years were reinstated by arbitrator decisions. 18 Some of these
officers were reinstated twice. 19 Accordingly, arbitration poses a systemic
challenge to the ability of public officials to hold law enforcement
accountable for their conduct—a challenge that crosses state and
jurisdictional lines.
This note begins by exploring the basics of arbitration: the role of
arbitration in the law and how it functions in employment disputes. 20 It then
moves on to discuss the limited methods to overturn arbitration awards. 21
Following this discussion, this note will look at arbitration involving law
Id. at 137.
Jennifer Bjorhus, Fired Minnesota Officers Have a Proven Career Saver: Arbitration, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis) (June 21, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-cops-firedthen-rehired/571392702 [https://perma.cc/DX9N-7EC9].
Id. (noting that the true figure could be higher because “Minnesota’s public records laws
prohibit releasing any information at all when arbitrators overturn a decision to fire a cop
without imposing any type of discipline. Such total exonerations, while uncommon, are
erased from public record.”).
16
17

18

19
20
21

Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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enforcement, both its role in the profession and its function in practice
across Minnesota. 22 The analysis of this note argues that while the role of
arbitration in law-enforcement employment decisions needs to be
revamped to provide for more democratic participation in the process, the
ability of courts to vacate arbitration awards under the public policy
exception should be expanded in Minnesota as a more immediate and
robust solution. 23 Finally, this note concludes that without reformation of
arbitration’s role in law enforcement employment, the public will bear a
perpetual risk of harm at the hands of officers whom officials have
discharged as a result of their conduct, but whom arbitrators, with no public
accountability, have reinstated. 24
II.

ARBITRATION AS A MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A. Defining Arbitration
The American Bar Association defines arbitration as “a private process
where disputing parties agree that one or several individuals can make a
decision about the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing
arguments.” 25 Arbitration can be understood as similar to a traditional trial
in its structure, but where alterations in procedure allow the disputes to be
settled more quickly and in a less formal proceeding. 26 Contrary to
mediation—where a third-party mediator has no decision power but acts as
a conduit for the parties to develop a mutually acceptable solution—
arbitrators have the authority to make a decision on the dispute. 27 This
decision is either binding or non-binding (advisory)—becoming final only if
the parties accept the decision—depending on the agreement made by the
parties. 28

B. Arbitration and Employment
Arbitration can be best described as the double-edged sword of
employment dispute resolution—providing an equitable, alternative means
of dispute resolution in some circumstances and creating an inherently
22
23
24

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Dispute
Resolution

Processes:
Arbitration,
AM.
BAR.
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProce
sses/arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/J4YU-XC68].
Id. (explaining that, opposed to traditional trials, parties in arbitration often do not have to
adhere to rules of evidence and arbitrators themselves may not be required to apply
governing law).
Id.; Dispute Resolution Processes: Mediation, AM. BAR. ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProce
sses/mediation/ [https://perma.cc/GC72-U6Q9].
AM. BAR. ASS’N, supra note 25.
25

26

27

28
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biased process in others. Employers, on one side, often utilize “forced
arbitration” to advantage themselves against employees. 29 In this, employers
condition valuable benefits, including receiving a job in the first place, on
the agreement of the individual to submit claims to arbitration instead of
presenting them to the public court system. 30 According to a recent survey
by the Economic Policy Institute, more than sixty million employees in
America are employed in a position that requires arbitration as a condition
of their employment. 31 These “forced arbitration” circumstances are meant
to provide employers with significant advantages for workplace-related
issues by removing or limiting valuable aspects of the public court system,
such as discovery and the appeals process. 32
On the other side, voluntary arbitration historically allows for quick,
relatively inexpensive settlements in commercial disputes. 33 This is also true
in situations of organized workplaces where workers are represented by
unions. 34 In these circumstances, the same disparity in bargaining power that
is present between employers and employees is not implicated, and both
sides have equal access to evidence necessary to prove their case. 35 As such,
arbitration that is not “forced” may not constitute the potentially
advantageous arena for the employer to pursue their interests, but rather
presents an inexpensive alternative to traditional dispute resolution through
the court system.

Arbitration
Agreements,
WORKPLACE
FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/forced-arbitration-agreements [https://perma.cc/ED8NTFZA].
Id. (“Usually such agreements provide that you have no right to go outside the arbitration
system and present your claims to the public courts. In force arbitration situations, your job
may depend on accepting such a provision: your only other choice is to not take the job.”).
Id. (“[M]ore than half of nonunion private sector employers have mandatory arbitration
procedures. Among private sector nonunion employees, 56.2 percent are subject to
mandatory employment arbitration procedures.”).
Id. (“The public court system provides the protection of a system relatively free from the
influence of the employer - a protection often not provided in forced arbitration.
Additionally, the court system is open to public scrutiny and its decisions are subject to
appeal. In employment cases, access to discovery is critical, since so much of the information
you need to prove your case is in your employer's hands . . . . These and many other valuable
features of the public court system are either limited or not available in the forced arbitration
system.”).
29

30

31

32

33
34

Id.
See id. (“Generally, the matters before the arbitrator involve issues of interpreting the

contract, and involve repeat users of the system.”).
35

Id.
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THE STANDARDS OF VACATING ARBITRATOR
DECISIONS

A. The Federal Standards of the FAA
Arbitration, like any other system, is not impervious to abuses or
unreasonable results. As such, it is not surprising that there are means for
the decisions of arbitrators to be challenged and, potentially, vacated.
Comparable to parties’ ability to challenge the decisions of courts through
the appeals process, parties can challenge an arbitrator’s decision in the
traditional court system. 36 However, due to several factors, including the
concern that regularly vacating arbitrator awards would undercut arbitration
as a system and disenfranchise a viable means of dispute resolution that
absorbs a portion of disputes that would otherwise end up in the court
system, there are very limited circumstances where courts have a recognized
authority to vacate arbitrator awards. 37 Statutorily, this authority flows from
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The FAA, originally enacted in 1925,
“empowers arbitration agreements in strong, unambiguous language.” 38 In
accordance with this focus on the empowerment of arbitration and the
valuable service arbitration provides the court system, the FAA offers very
few circumstances that justify the vacating of an arbitration award. 39
Arbitrator awards that were procured through undue means, situations
where there is evident partiality in the arbitrator, or the presence of other
misconduct in the proceedings, constitute grounds to vacate an arbitrator’s
award. 40 Additionally, there has been a concerted effort to reserve certain
authorities for the courts and provide protections against arbitrators who
See Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police Discipline: The Public Policy
Exception, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 540, 549–50 (2013) (discussing challenging an arbitrator’s

36

decision in court).
See id. at 548 (“Arbitration is endorsed by courts as a speedier, more cost efficient way to
resolve disputes and reduce the burdens on courts. Thus, at some level, courts are reluctant
to encourage post-arbitration litigation. The benefits of arbitration over court litigation are
quickly dissipated if courts routinely open the doors to subsequently contest substantial
numbers of arbitration decisions.”).
Id. at 547. This is further emphasized in that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate disputes ‘… shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of a contract.’” Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)) (This quote notes both the
statutory and common law grounds for vacating an arbitration decision).
See id. at 549–52.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (“(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration—(1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced . . . .”).
37

38

39
40
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commit unrectifiable error in the performance of their duties. 41

B. Vacating Arbitrator Awards Beyond the Scope of the FAA
While the FAA provides a statutory framework under which courts
have a recognized authority to vacate arbitrator awards, it also references an
additional common law basis on which courts can vacate these awards. 42
While the Supreme Court has asserted that the ability of a court to review a
labor-arbitration decision is “very limited,” 43 it has also recognized the
responsibility of courts to refrain from enforcing a contract that is contrary
to public policy—likening arbitrator decisions to contractual agreements. 44
This responsibility has been referred to as the public policy exception to the
traditional deference shown by courts to the decisions of arbitrators. 45
While often cited in court opinions addressing a challenge to an
arbitrator’s award, the public policy exception is rarely utilized to overturn
those awards. 46 Just as the Court has affirmed the idea that the ability of a
court to review arbitration decisions is very limited, so too are the
circumstances under which those decisions can be vacated. The Court’s
discussion of the public policy exception reflects this idea of limited court
authority to review arbitrator decisions and that, as currently understood,
there are only a narrow collection of circumstances that allow for a court to
vacate arbitration awards under the justification of this standard.
Early discussion and application of the public policy exception at the
federal level is found in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759. In W.R.
Grace, an employer was facing liability for violations of Title VII of the Civil

Id. (“In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration . . . (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.”).
See WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, supra note 29 (“. . . or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”).
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (citations
omitted) (quoting Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)) (“Courts are not
authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite allegations that the
decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement . . . . [I]f an ‘arbitrator
is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority,’ the fact that ‘a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to
overturn his decision.’”); see W.R. Grace and Co. v. Loc. Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764
(1983).
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 57 (2000)
(citing W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766) (“Since the award is not distinguishable from the
contractual agreement, the Court must decide whether a contractual reinstatement
requirement would fall within the legal exception that makes unenforceable ‘a collective
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.’”).
See generally id. at 63.
See Iris, supra note 36, at 559.
41

42

43

44

45
46
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Rights Act of 1964. 47 To address this violation, the employer signed a
conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that conflicted with the employer’s collective bargaining
agreement with its unionized workforce. 48 Grievances were filed, employees
were laid off, and when those employees were reinstated to their entitled
positions under the collective bargaining agreement, their grievances
seeking backpay moved to arbitration. 49 Eventually, an award was delivered
to the employees. 50 While the arbitrator accepted the employer’s contention
that it had acted in good faith in following the conciliation agreement, he
nevertheless determined that the employer “acted at its own risk in
breaching the [collective bargaining] agreement.” 51 The employer, then,
challenged the arbitrator’s award. 52
While the district court found in favor of the employer in that “public
policy prevented enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement,” 53 the
court of appeals reversed. 54 In addressing the enforcement of the arbitrator’s
award, the Supreme Court laid out the components of the public policy
exception:
If the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some
explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it.
Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained “by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests.” 55
Perhaps the most important part of this standard is the idea that the
public policy implicated must be made in reference to “laws and legal
precedents” and not from general considerations of “supposed public
interests.” This limitation, while potentially creating a more consistent
standard—as all courts within a jurisdiction must rely on the same body of
public interests determined through legislation—simultaneously hinders the
ability of courts to acknowledge accepted public interests that have not been
“put to paper” in addressing arbitrator awards that may be incompatible with
those interests.
Four years after the Court’s opinion in W.R. Grace, the Court seemed
to acknowledge the inconsistency in this standard. In United Paperworkers
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

W.R. Grace., 461 U.S. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 763 (alteration in original).
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766 (citation omitted) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
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International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., the Court discussed the
56

common law underpinning the public policy exception. There, the Court
stated that the public policy exception is a “specific application of the more
general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to
enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.” 57 Perhaps most
interesting here is the Court’s distinction between written law and public
policy despite their conflation in the doctrine of the public policy
exception. 58 Despite acknowledging this distinction, the Court in Misco
affirmed the standards of W.R. Grace:
Two points follow from our decision in W.R. Grace. First, a court
may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when the
specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy.
Second, it is apparent that our decision in that case does not
otherwise sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration
awards as against public policy. Although we discussed the effect
of that award on two broad areas of public policy, our decision
turned on our examination of whether the award created any
explicit conflict with other “laws and legal precedents” rather than
an assessment of “general considerations of supposed public
interest.” At the very least, an alleged public policy must be
properly framed under the approach set out in W.R. Grace, and
the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is
not to be enforced. 59
In simpler terms there are, generally, two circumstances under which
a court can vacate an arbitration award under the public policy exception in
cases that involve collective bargaining agreements—known as labor
agreements in some cases: (1) if the collective bargaining agreement contains
terms that violate public policy, or (2) the arbitration award creates an
explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents. 60
The standards of these cases have continued through to our current
understanding of the public policy exception. In 2000, the Court again
asserted that “[a]ny such [public] policy must be ‘explicit,’ ‘well defined,’
and ‘dominant,’ and it must be ‘ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents, not from general considerations of supposed public

Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Id. at 42 (expanding later “[t]hat doctrine derives from the basic notion that no court will
lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act, and is further
justified by the observation that the public’s interests in confining the scope of private
agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account
of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agreements.”).
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
See State v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. 1993).
56
57

58
59
60
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interests.’” 61 Interestingly, the Court here hinted at some flexibility to the
application of the public policy exception before, again, affirming the
standards of W.R. Grace and Misco. 62

C. Minnesota Statutory Standards
Like the federal government’s legislation denoting the authority of
courts to vacate arbitration awards on limited grounds, the Minnesota
legislature has codified a similar standard that, in many ways, reflects the
language of the FAA. Here, the Minnesota statute sets similar standards for
vacating awards procured through undue means, situations of evident
partiality or corruption, and the presence of other procedural misconduct. 63
However, the Minnesota standard also includes protections for arbitrations
conducted without proper notice and with other procedural issues that are
not mentioned in the FAA. 64

D. Minnesota and the Public Policy Exception
As the Minnesota statutory standard for vacating arbitration awards is
derivative of the federal standard of the FAA, its standard regarding the
public policy exception is similarly derivative of the Supreme Court
standard. The Minnesota Supreme Court has directly cited cases like W.R.
Grace and Misco in defining the public policy exception. 65 Accordingly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the same standard regarding the
public policy exception in considering the implications of an arbitrator’s
award and potentially vacating that award. 66 The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, has noted that the court’s public policy exception standard is still
E. Ass’d Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 57–58 (2000)
(quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
E. Ass’d Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 63 (“We agree, in principle, that courts’ authority to
invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration
award itself violates positive law. Nevertheless, the public policy exception is narrow and
must satisfy the principles set forth in W.R. Grace and Misco.”).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 572B.23 (2020) (“(a) Upon motion of a party to the arbitration
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award if: (1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means; (2) there was: (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed
as a neutral; (B) corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the
hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 572B.15,
so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an
arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers. . . .”), with 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002).
61

62

63

See MINN. STAT. § 572B.23 (2020) (“. . . (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper
notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section 572B.09 so as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.”).
Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d at 756–57.
64

65
66

Id.
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open to interpretation in some areas. 67 In this, the court cites Justice
Blackmun’s concurrence in Misco:
In particular, the Court does not reach the issue upon which
certiorari was granted: whether a court may refuse to enforce an
arbitration award rendered under a collective-bargaining
agreement on public policy grounds only when the award itself
violates positive law or requires unlawful conduct by the
employer. The opinion takes no position on this issue. Nor do I
understand the Court to decide, more generally, in what way, if
any, a court’s authority to set aside an arbitration award on public
policy grounds differs from its authority, outside the collectivebargaining context, to refuse to enforce a contract on public
policy grounds. Those issues are left for another day. 68
The court goes on to discuss this unresolved area and notes that many
courts that have addressed the issue, including the Eighth Circuit, require
that the award be at least inconsistent with some public policy before it will
be vacated. 69 There is an important distinction drawn by Minnesota courts,
flowing from the Misco decision, between the conduct of the party and the
award provided by the arbitrator, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s later
decision stating that this distinction is not determinative. 70
The distinction drawn by courts between the conduct of the party and
the award provided by the arbitrator is evidenced in State Auditor. There,
the court specifically stated that while the individual’s conduct may appear
to violate a well-defined and dominant public policy, that does not mean it
can be assumed that an award reinstating that individual violates that public
policy. 71 Ultimately, the court found that the arbitrator’s award reinstating an
individual whose conduct violated a well-defined and dominant public
policy did not, itself, violate that policy. 72 Accordingly, the question for
67
68

Id. at 757.
Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 46

(1987)).

Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps, 504 N.W.2d at 757 (“While this issue thus remains unresolved,
many courts, when confronted with similar claims, have focused on the arbitrator’s award
and have refused to strike down an award that is not in direct conflict with any explicit public
policy. While some of these courts have held that they will not overrule an arbitrator’s award
unless it actually violates some positive law or otherwise compels illegal conduct, even those
courts which have taken a broader view of the public policy exception, such as the Eighth
Circuit, at least require that the award itself be inconsistent with some public policy before it
will be vacated.”) (footnote omitted).
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d at 757. (“Under the facts of this case, while Beer’s
conduct would appear to violate a well-defined and dominant public policy against the
embezzlement of state funds by public employees, we cannot automatically conclude that the
arbitrator’s award reinstating Beer violates that public policy.”) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 757–58.
69

70
71

72
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courts, in the second circumstance of vacating an arbitrator’s award in cases
involving collective bargaining agreements, 73 is not whether the conduct of
the party was against public policy, but whether the award provided by the
arbitrator, specifically, is counter to public policy. Additionally, there are a
variety of interpretations regarding the degree that the award must conflict
with public policy—whether it must actively violate positive law or simply be
inconsistent with public policy.
Minnesota courts have also limited the authority of arbitrators
regarding constitutional questions. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held
that “in the public sector an arbitrator has no authority to make
constitutional determinations, irrespective of the language of the arbitration
agreement.” 74 As evidenced by the court in this decision, there are other
means by which courts regulate arbitrations, such as established, courtimposed limitations on arbitrator authority in some situations.
IV.

ARBITRATION INVOLVING LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS

A. Unionization, Arbitration, and the Employment of Law Enforcement
Officers
As discussed previously, most police officers are represented by
unions and covered by collective bargaining agreements. 75 Like any other
collective bargaining agreement, these agreements are meant to protect the
union members. These agreements can include various protections to
officers in addition to protections they may already enjoy through state
statutes or other means. 76 In addition to the arbitration clauses that most of
these agreements include, clauses referred to as “just cause” provisions
provide even greater protection to officers by forcing departments to bear
the burden of persuasion to prove that disciplinary action is supported by
“just cause”—the meaning of the term is derived from principles of
fundamental fairness and is rarely defined in these agreements. 77 All this
being said, the unionization of police is a relatively new development in the
See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 57
(2000).
Cnty. of Hennepin v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 527 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1995)
(reaffirming City of Richfield v. Loc. No. 1215, etc., 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979) and
McGrath v. State, 312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1981)).
Adams, supra note 13.
Id. at 144 (“Along with protections granted by collective bargaining agreements, police
officers often enjoy due process rights granted by the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of
Rights (LEOBOR). LEOBORs are found in collective bargaining agreements or state
statutes. Generally, LEOBORs provide police officers accused of misconduct certain
protections, such as the right against self-incrimination during an investigation.”) (footnotes
omitted).
Id. at 140.
73

74

75
76

77
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labor movement. 78 For much of American history, police did not have the
legal right to unionize, partially due to the Boston Police Department Strike
of 1919 when about two-thirds of Boston’s police force made a bid for
higher pay and better hours by refusing to report for duty, leading to riots
and numerous deaths. 79 This delayed the right of police to unionize for
decades. 80
Today, however, “police unionization has strong supporters on both
sides of the political aisle.” 81 State statutes on police unionization “generally
permit police officers to bargain collectively on any matter related to wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment,” though, “[t]erms like
‘conditions of employment’ present some interpretive complexity.” 82 In this,
If read broadly, this sort of language can become a “catchall
phrase into which almost any proposal may fall.” To prevent such
a broad interpretation, courts and state labor relations boards
have found that so-called managerial prerogatives are not subject
to collective bargaining as conditions of employment. For all
practical purposes, though, courts have held that many
disciplinary procedures qualify as conditions of employment
rather than managerial prerogatives. 83
Despite the positives that these agreements provide in assuring law
enforcement are properly compensated and that their employment
conditions are appropriate, “studies have found that police union contracts
frequently include language that impedes officer investigation and oversight
by delaying officer interrogations, limiting civilian oversight, expunging
records of prior officer misconduct, and more.” 84 And, again, one
prominent feature of these agreements is that they frequently require the
arbitration of disciplinary appeals. 85
Rather than being characterized as an asset to ensuring equitable rights
and protections to law enforcement officers in their employment, this
arbitration is often characterized as a problematic system that presents
accountability issues and obstructs the internal discipline of police as well as
public oversight. 86 Examples of this obstructive nature are prevalent across
Rushin, supra note 7, at 557.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 559 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 560.
See Martha Bellisle, Police in Misconduct Cases Stay on Force Through Arbitration, MPR

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

NEWS (June 24, 2020), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/06/24/police-in-misconductcases-stay-on-force-through-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/J4EY-U578]
(“‘Arbitration
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the country, and Minnesota is no exception. 87 While the ability of police to
unionize and pursue their employment priorities through collective
bargaining has an indisputable place in the labor market, the agreements
they form through those efforts also have a propensity to insulate police
from accountability through the arbitration they provide. 88 This insulation is
not limited to minor offenses and, as seen in the following examples, can
require police forces to reinstate officers despite violent and repeated
misconduct. 89

B. Minnesota’s Pattern of Arbitration Favoring Law Enforcement, Court
Deference to Those Decisions, and the Refusal to Apply the Public Policy
Exception
On New Year’s Eve of 1990, Craig Mische was arrested at a
Minneapolis nightclub formerly known as Juke Box Saturday Night. 90
Mische alleged that while he was in custody, the arresting officer, Michael
Sauro, beat him with his fists and feet and that, as a result, Mische suffered
facial lacerations, bruising, swelling, and bleeding. 91 A civil suit was filed
against Sauro and the City of Minneapolis where the jury returned a special
verdict in favor of Mische for Sauro’s use of excessive force and the City’s
“custom of deliberate indifference to complaints concerning the use of
excessive force by Minneapolis police officers.” 92 After this verdict and an
internal investigation into Sauro’s conduct, Sauro was terminated from the
police force. 93 The Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis filed
grievances under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and these
inherently undermines police decisions,’ said Michael Gennaco, a police reform expert and
former federal civil rights prosecutor who specialized in police misconduct cases.”); see
Bjorhus, supra note 17 (“Chief Medaria Arradondo noted the discipline and arbitration
process as areas needing reform. ‘There is nothing more debilitating to a chief from an
employment matter perspective, than when you have grounds to terminate an officer for
misconduct, and you’re dealing with a third-party mechanism that allows for that employee
to not only be back on your department, but to be patrolling in your communities,’
Arradondo said.”); see Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs
Back
Through
Arbitration,
MPR
NEWS
(July
9,
2020),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-theirjobs-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/JJ9Y-YD3U] (“Richfield Mayor Maria Regan
Gonzalez said the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Kinsey undermined the city’s efforts to
create a more community-oriented police force. ‘How are we going to continue to build trust
with our community, when we don’t have the power and the leverage to terminate officers
that aren’t on the same page or aren’t a good fit for our community?’ Gonzalez said.”).
See infra Part IV.B.
Rushin, supra note 7, at 553.
See infra Part IV.B.
City of Minneapolis v. Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis, 566 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997).
87
88
89
90

91
92
93

Id.
Id.
Id. at 85–86.
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grievances then proceeded to arbitration. 94 The arbitrator, in the award,
reinstated Sauro while upholding a twenty-day suspension given to him. 95
The City then commenced an action seeking to vacate that award, but the
district court concluded that it did not have a “legal basis” to do so. 96
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited State Auditor as the
basis for the state’s public policy exception jurisprudence. 97 The court
agreed with the district court in holding that “the city has failed to present
any well-defined, dominant public policy that prohibits police officers found
to have used excessive force from being reinstated to the police force.” 98 The
court noted that “[i]t is axiomatic that there is a well-defined and dominant
public policy against police officers using excessive force. However, as the
district court concluded, there is no well-defined public policy stating that
an officer must automatically be discharged if he or she is involved in an
excessive force situation.” 99 The court also brought attention to the fact that
the police department itself did not have a “well-defined policy or practice
that officers found to have used excessive force must be automatically
discharged.” 100 Ultimately, the arbitrator’s award reinstating Sauro was
upheld. 101
In another case from 2005, a woman issued a complaint against a
Duluth police officer stating that he had come into her apartment and
assaulted her. 102 Criminal charges were brought as well as disciplinary
procedures, and while a jury acquitted the officer of the criminal charges,
the City discharged the officer. 103 The officer’s collective bargaining agency
then filed a grievance on behalf of the officer, and, according to the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, the matter went to arbitration, and
the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the officer’s grievance and ordering

94
95
96

Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. (“The district court concluded that there was no legal basis to conclude the arbitrator

exceeded his authority or violated the essence of the parties’ CBA. The district court also
ruled that there is no well-defined and dominant public policy requiring the automatic
discharge of a police officer who was found to have used excessive force by a civil jury.”).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 89. This is reflective of the standard previously discussed of courts drawing a
distinction between the conduct of the party and the arbitration award. Here, the question is
not whether there is a well-defined, dominant public policy against police use of excessive
force. Instead, it is a very limited, very specific question of whether there is a well-defined,
dominant public policy that prohibits the reinstatement of officers who have been found to
have used excessive force.
97
98

99
100

Id.
Id. (explaining that “[a]s the district court found, the record shows several instances where

officers found to have used excessive force were disciplined, but not discharged.”).
Id. at 90.
City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Loc., No. A04-2374, 2005 WL 1620352, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 12, 2005).
101
102

103

Id.
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his reinstatement. 104
During arbitration, the City argued that the arbitrator violated public
policy in admitting polygraph testimony contrary to Minnesota’s legal
precedent of not admitting such evidence. 105 The appellate court, however,
was not persuaded by this argument. 106 In its decision, the court stated that
“Minnesota has no precedent of admitting, or not admitting, polygraph
evidence in arbitrations: it is inadmissible only in court cases. The
arbitrator’s award, even if based in part on polygraph evidence, does not
create a conflict with any law or legal precedent.” 107 Again, the arbitrator’s
award was upheld in these circumstances. 108
Ten years later, in 2015, Officer Nathan Kinsey from Richfield was
recorded pushing a nineteen-year-old Somali man twice and slapping him
on the back of the head. 109 Kinsey issued a careless driving citation to the
man but did not include any mention of his use of force in his notes on the
citation. 110 The recorded video circulated on social media, and while no
criminal charges were brought against Kinsey, an internal investigation was
launched. 111 This internal investigation found violations of several
department policies, and as a result, Kinsey was discharged. 112
The police union challenged Kinsey’s discharge under its collective
bargaining agreement, and this challenge was brought to arbitration. 113
Ultimately, the arbitrator decided that the City did not have just cause to
terminate Kinsey and ordered his reinstatement. 114 The City then moved to
vacate the arbitrator’s award on public policy grounds, but the district court
upheld the award. 115 However, on appeal to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, the court agreed with the City that reinstating Kinsey would
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1985)).
Id. at *4.

109

City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 923 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2019).

110

Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. (“After a 5-day hearing, the arbitrator issued a 40-page decision, concluding: 1) given

111
112
113
114

the totality of the circumstances, Kinsey did not use excessive or unreasonable force in this
incident; 2) the City’s policy on reporting use of force was not clear, and Kinsey was not
technically required to report the type of force that he used, but he should have alerted the
command staff to the incident; 3) Kinsey’s actions were not motivated by racial bias; and 4)
his use of profanity violated department policy but ‘[did] not warrant disciplinary action.’
The arbitrator concluded that Kinsey did not intend to deceive or conceal information from
his supervisors, but that failing to report the use of force was a ‘lapse in judgement constituting
unacceptable performance that warrants disciplinary action.’”).
Id. (stating, “the [C]ity[ ] failed to present any well-defined, dominant public policy that
prohibits police officers who are disciplined or counseled for use of excessive force but who
are then charged with excessive force, from being reinstated to the police force.”).
115
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interfere with public policy. 116 The union appealed this decision, and,
ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the union and
reversed the decision of the court of appeals, effectively reinstating the
award of the arbitrator. 117 In its rationale, the court stated that there were no
available facts to support applying the public policy exception. 118 In dicta,
however, it appears the court did not particularly agree with this holding but
was limited in its authority to hold differently:
No doubt many observers would find Kinsey’s actions disturbing.
But state statute requires arbitration, and the City’s contract with
the Union gives the arbitrator the authority to decide what
constitutes just cause for termination. Applying the statute and the
language in the contract, and deferring to the facts as found by the
arbitrator, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 119
Lastly, during an arrest in 2017, Officer Adam Huot of the City of
Duluth’s police department grabbed the chain connecting the arrested
individual’s handcuffs and “dragged him along the floor for about 100 feet
through the skywalk to an elevator. On the way to the elevator, Huot
dragged [the individual] through a doorway, where [their] head struck the
metal doorframe.” 120 Although Huot called two other officers later that night
to discuss the incident, he did not report the use of force to his supervisor. 121
The City determined that Huot’s conduct violated the police department’s
use-of-force policy and code of conduct, and based on these determinations,
terminated Huot. 122 Huot’s union, of course, challenged his termination
pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement, and the dispute was
ultimately referred to binding arbitration. 123 The arbitrator, despite finding
that Huot’s use of force was unreasonable and that he had been involved in
a prior use-of-force incident, determined that, while discipline was
warranted, the collective bargaining agreement called for progressive
discipline and Huot’s conduct did not justify termination under the

116
117
118

Id.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. (“Assuming without deciding that a public-policy exception permits courts to vacate

arbitration awards, the facts here do not support applying the exception. It is difficult to
conclude that the arbitration award violates public policy given the finding that excessive force
was not used. Kinsey’s failure to report does not provide a basis for applying the public-policy
exception because the arbitrator found that, even though Kinsey should have reported the
incident, the City’s policy was not clear on that question.”).
Id. at 42.
City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Union, Loc. No. 807, No. A19-0404, 2019 WL 4165031,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2019).
119
120

121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Id.
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agreement. 124
The City moved to have the award vacated by the district court, but the
court denied this motion, reasoning that “while Huot’s conduct was contrary
to public policy, the arbitrator’s award did not violate any ‘well-defined
public policy.’” 125 The City appealed, asserting that the arbitrator’s award
did, in fact, violate a well-defined public policy. 126 In its decision, the court
of appeals stated that the speculation of the command staff regarding Huot’s
potential to misuse force again, and the arbitrator’s inability to find fault in
that speculation, was not enough to justify vacating the award. 127 Additionally,
the arbitrator’s description of Huot as having a “penchant” for misusing
force did not “constitute a prediction that he will continue to act accordingly;
it merely recognizes Huot’s past practices.” 128 Ultimately, the court of
appeals found that, while Huot’s use of force was contrary to a public policy
against unreasonable use of force, the arbitrator’s award reinstating Huot
was not. 129

C. The Exception of City of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor
Services, Inc. 130
Despite the pattern of Minnesota courts upholding arbitrator decisions
in cases involving law enforcement, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota went
against this pattern in the circumstances of John R. Barlow. 131 In 1993, a
Id. at *1–2 (“The arbitrator ruled that Huot’s conduct was an unreasonable use of force
that violated the department’s use-of-force policy and that Huot’s failure to promptly report
the use of force violated the department’s policy on reporting use of force. The arbitrator
also found that Huot had been involved in a prior use-of-force incident in which he
repeatedly punched a man in the head in order to get the man to drop a shard of glass, even
though other officers were restraining the man . . . . Huot was also involved in two other
incidents that were deemed not to be use-of-force incidents. Huot received coaching, but not
discipline, for those two incidents . . . . The arbitrator stated that Huot’s conduct in the
incident at issue, in light of the fact that he had already been trained and coached about use
of force, caused ‘command staff to speculate’ that he would misuse force again if reinstated.
The arbitrator continued, ‘The Arbitrator cannot find fault with this speculation. [Officer]
Huot and his career as a police officer is at a crossroad: Either he takes control of his
penchant for misusing vocal and physical force or he will be fired: A third use of force
violation would be his last.’”).
Id. at *2.

124

125
126
127

Id.
Id. at *4 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,

44 (1987) (“[W]hile the arbitrator did not find fault with such speculation, he also did not
find that it was substantiated or that it was anything more than speculation. ‘A refusal to
enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or assumption.’”)).
128
129

Id.
Id. Again, displaying the distinction that courts draw between the conduct of the party and

the award of the arbitrator in addressing the public policy exception.
City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001).
Id. at 244.
130

131
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female employee of the Brooklyn Center Police Department filed a
complaint against Barlow alleging that Barlow committed criminal sexual
conduct against her. 132 While criminal charges could not be brought as the
statute of limitations had expired, the City still decided to fire Barlow. 133
Under his collective bargaining agreement, Barlow demanded arbitration in
challenging the termination. 134 Although they made no express findings as to
the truthfulness of the allegations against him, the arbitrator determined that
Barlow was entitled to reinstatement and entered an award in accordance
with that determination. 135
Then, in 1997, a member of the public filed a complaint against
Barlow accusing him of harassing and stalking her. 136 Barlow was prosecuted
and found not guilty by the jury. 137 However, during an internal investigation,
the City obtained records containing complaints against Barlow by more
than thirty women. 138 Based on this, the investigator determined that Barlow
had “demonstrated patterns of improper conduct.” 139 The police chief

132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“The Brooklyn Center police chief then held a televised press conference during

which he showed Barlow’s photograph and asked that anyone with complaints against Barlow
contact the police department. In response, a number of women called the department to
complain about Barlow’s behavior toward them.”).
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id. at 239 (“[I]ncluding regularly meeting young women in the routine course of working,

and later returning, while on duty and in uniform, to arrange dates; conducting traffic stops
of young women, which resulted in neither the issuance of a citation nor a warning,
apparently for the sole purpose of gathering personal information about the young women
or for making personal comments to facilitate potential social relationships; repeatedly
visiting local businesses, while on duty and in uniform, for excessive periods of time for the
purpose of watching and talking to young women; driving Brooklyn Center Police squad cars
to visit the homes (both within and outside of the city’s jurisdiction) of young women he was
either dating or trying to persuade to date him; demonstrating unwanted persistence in
placing telephone calls or approaching young women he was trying to date; following women,
often while he was in uniform and in a Brooklyn Center squad car, for no apparent reason
and in a manner that frightened the women he was following; repeatedly stating that he
needed to know everything about the young women he was trying to date, or, in the
alternative, saying he could find out everything about them; describing the interiors or
exteriors of the women’s homes, even though he had never been invited to the residences;
belittling the boyfriends or significant others of women he was trying to date; making sexually
suggestive comments to women he encountered on duty; running license plate numbers for
his personal use of women he wanted to date; using his position as a police officer to gather
personal information to be used to further his social life; using his influence as a police officer
(through showing his badge) to gain entrance into nightclubs to check for under-aged women;
acting in a sexually aggressive manner while on duty; intimidating women who confronted
him about unwanted telephone calls; maintaining that he wanted women he met while on
duty to bear his children; and purchasing alcohol for minors.”).
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subsequently recommended that the City fire Barlow, which it did. 140
Once again, Barlow filed a grievance challenging the termination,
which went to arbitration. 141 Fifteen women who had complained about
Barlow testified at the arbitration, but, despite this testimony, the arbitrator
concluded that “much of the alleged conduct was time-barred for
disciplinary purposes and that the remaining conduct, while serious, did not
warrant outright dismissal.” 142 Accordingly, the arbitrator issued an award in
Barlow’s favor, reinstating him. 143 The City moved in district court to vacate
the award under a public policy argument, but the district court denied the
City’s motion. 144
In describing its approach to the matter, the court of appeals cited State
Auditor in defining the public policy exception as a standard where “a court
may set aside an arbitration award only if (1) the labor agreement contains
terms which violate public policy, or (2) the arbitration award creates an
explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents.” 145 The court followed
this by asserting that “it is indisputable that Minnesota’s public policy
proscribes invasion of privacy, stalking, harassment, and sexual
harassment.” 146 Expanding on this, the court stated that an employer has an
affirmative duty to take action reasonably calculated to prevent sexual
harassment in the workplace, “particularly from employees who have
committed acts of sexual harassment in the past.” 147 The court then applied
this line of reasoning to the circumstances of Barlow’s arbitration award:
Recognizing the strong and clear public policy against sexual
harassment, the affirmative duty of employers to implement that
policy, and the unique opportunity of a police officer with a
lengthy history of violations of that policy to continue to commit
similar violations, we hold that the arbitrator’s decision under the
extreme facts of this case violated public policy and must be
vacated. 148
It is important to note in discussing the exception this case presents,
however, that it appears that Barlow’s history of misconduct was likely not
the deciding factor in the case. 149 The court stated later that “[t]o allow
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240.
Id. The city also alleged that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Id.
Id. at 241 (citing State v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn. 1993)).
Id. at 242 (expanding with references to: MINN. STAT. § 609.746, subdiv. 1 (2000); MINN.

STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 2 (2000); and MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subdiv. 4 (2000)).
Id. at 243 (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 676 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 244 (later adding that “[Barlow] violates the law with apparent impunity and perhaps
will be even more resolute in his misconduct if his reinstatement is allowed.”).
147
148

149

Id.
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Barlow to continue to work as a police officer for Brooklyn Center is
tantamount to exempting the city from its duty to enforce its own policy and
the public policy against sexual harassment.” 150
Despite acknowledging Barlow’s history of misconduct and the
potential for him to continue that behavior if he were reinstated, the court
conceded that its authority to vacate that reinstatement award is only due to
the explicit public policy regarding sexual harassment. 151 It is the City’s duty
to prevent sexual harassment that sustained Barlow’s discharge, not the
serious misconduct he committed.
V.
REFORMING THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT AND THE APPLICATION OF
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

A. The Need for Reform
The cases discussed in the previous section demonstrate an established
pattern of court deference to arbitration decisions favoring law enforcement
and refusal to apply the public policy exception, regardless of the degree of
misconduct committed by the officer in question. 152 Even cases that involve
long-established patterns of misconduct can be found in favor of the
offending officer, with rare exceptions. 153 This pattern creates two major
issues for our policing system: the continued presence of potentially violent
and aggressive individuals in roles of authority, and the continued frustration
of police officials’ attempts to regulate their officers and the conduct of those
officers. 154 Ultimately, the problematic nature of arbitration in police
discipline can be traced to the systemic failure to recognize the inherent
Id.
Id.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B. But see supra Part IV.C.
See Bjorhus, supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text; Kaomi Lee, Is Arbitration a Fair
Way to Decide Police Firings?, TPT ORIGINALS (Aug. 10, 2020),

150
151
152
153
154

https://www.tptoriginals.org/police-reform-and-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/9JJR-LDFR]
(“‘If the police chief in the organization doesn’t have the authority to take away a position as
important as this in society, and leaves this to arbitration, I think that’s problematic,’ Duluth
Police Chief Michael Tusken told Almanac earlier this summer . . . . ‘I think arbitration has
its place – if it’s union contracts, if it’s minor disputes, I think it’s fine. If we are looking at
gross misconduct, if we are looking at violations of our code of conduct, I think there should
be a different route and a different path for us to take,’ he said.”); Rushin, supra note 7, at
576, 578 (“The majority of communities—around seventy percent—vest arbitrators with
significant review authority on appeal. That is, these jurisdictions effectively give arbitrators
the power to re-review all relevant issues on appeal . . . . [A]n expansive or de novo standard
of review on appeal may insulate officers from democratic accountability. It diminishes the
ability of police supervisors, city officials, and civilian review boards to reform police
departments . . . . This effectively means that any earlier disciplinary action taken against a
police officer by a city official, police supervisor, or civilian review board is somewhat
symbolic. Significant power sits with the arbitrator on appeal.”).

358

2022]

THE ILLUSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 359

differences between general arbitration and arbitration that involves the
employment of law enforcement officers. 155
Our society entrusts enormous power and authority to our law
enforcement officers—power and authority that are not regularly present in
general arbitration. 156 While the arbitration of a dispute between two private
parties will likely have no effect on the general public, the same cannot be
said for arbitration that involves the employment of a police officer accused
of misconduct. 157 Treating these arbitrations as the same and holding them
to the same standards is an inarguably illogical and reckless approach to
regulating the conduct of individuals entrusted with the power and authority
society provides law enforcement officers. The direct effect of law
enforcement arbitration decisions on the public requires greater oversight
than what is held over general arbitration.
One of the most evident issues in the use of arbitration regarding police
discipline is the lack of accountability for the arbitrators making the
decisions. Arbitration regarding police discipline “allows third parties, often
from outside the community, to make final disciplinary decisions that can
go against the will of police supervisors or civilian oversight entities. In this
way, arbitration can arguably constitute an antidemocratic limitation on
public oversight of law enforcement behavior.” 158Arbitrators have no
accountability to the public affected by their decisions and have authority to
make decisions based on their subjective standards and opinions rather than

See Tate Fegley, How the Police Arbitration System Shields Police from Accountability,
MISES INST. (June 17, 2020), https://mises.org/wire/how-police-arbitration-system-shieldspolice-accountability [https://perma.cc/9RUV-GK79] (“Courts are ‘strictly bound by an
arbitrator’s findings and legal conclusions, even if they appear erroneous, inconsistent, or
unsupported by the record.’ This deference to arbitrators makes sense when the dispute is
between two private parties who previously agreed to be bound by an arbitrator’s decision
and when the dispute only involves those parties. If either party can simply appeal an adverse
decision to a government court, the system of private arbitration is completely undermined.
However, it makes much less sense when what is in dispute is to what degree police officers
are allowed to use violence.”) (citations omitted).
See Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the
Street, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/howpolice-unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/
[https://perma.cc/6C2C-GMCX]
(“Society entrusts police officers with awesome power. The stakes could not be higher when
they abuse it: Innocents are killed, wrongly imprisoned, beaten, harassed—and as knowledge
of such abuses spreads, respect for the rule of law wanes. If police officers were at-will
employees (as I've been at every job I've ever held), none of the cops mentioned above would
now be walking the streets with badges and loaded guns. Perhaps one or two of them
deserved to be exonerated, despite how bad their cases look. Does the benefit of being
scrupulously fair to those individuals justify the cost of having more abusive cops on the
street?”).
See id.; Fegley, supra note 155.
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L. J. 1191, 1239 (2017).
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on the facts of the case and relevant law or applicable policies. 159
The potential for arbitrator decisions to be based on subjective opinion
rather than facts, and the refusal of courts to exercise oversight over these
decisions, constitute a disservice to the general public and the individuals
harmed by the conduct of offending officers. Examples of these
controversial arbitrator decisions are not difficult to find.
In a 2014 case, an officer was discharged for sexually harassing a
female crime victim. The officer had turned off his dash camera
in violation of the department’s recording policy, leaving no video
evidence to prove the officer’s misconduct. To support the
discharge, the city offered results of a polygraph test suggesting
the officer had inappropriately touched the victim while in his
squad car. The arbitrator overturned the discharge because he
was “not convinced” that the evidence was sufficient to infer guilt.
The arbitrator thought the victim lacked credibility and that
testimony supporting the discharge was “contradictory.” 160
One of the most egregious of these examples, arguably, comes from
the Huot case discussed previously in this article. 161 There, the arbitrator
recognized Huot’s history of misconduct and did not fault the command
staff’s speculation that Huot would continue to misuse force if reinstated. 162
However, the arbitrator asserted that the collective bargaining agreement
involved called for “progressive discipline,” which justified allowing Huot to
retain his position. 163 In this, the arbitrator introduced a subjective “three
strikes and you’re out” approach to the issue. 164 Despite Huot’s history of
misusing force, and the appropriate speculation by officials that he would
continue to do so if reinstated, the arbitrator disregarded these facts and
inserted their own determination based on a subjective belief that
termination would only be justified after a third misuse of force. 165 This
subjective approach, instituted by an individual arbitrator with no public
accountability, is not based on fact, law, or any cognizable policy, and was
Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the ‘refusal of courts to review the merits of an
arbitration award is … proper,’ an arbitrator ‘can be wrong on the facts and wrong on the law
and a court will not overturn the arbitrator’s opinion.’”). See Fegley, supra note 155 (“Since
they are selected from a list agreed upon by police management and unions, and since the
courts’ scope to review their decisions is extremely narrow, arbitrators are unaccountable to
the public for their decisions regarding the policies governing police use of force.”).
Adams, supra note 13, at 143–44. (footnotes omitted).
See City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Union, Loc. No. 807, No. A19-0404, 2019 WL
4165031 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2019); see supra notes 120–129 and accompany text.
City of Duluth, 2019 WL 4165031, at *2.
159

160
161

162

Id.
Id. (“Huot and his career as a police officer is at a crossroad: Either he takes control of his
penchant for misusing vocal and physical force or he will be fired: A third use of force
163
164

violation would be his last.”).
165

Id.
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the basis for reinstating an officer with a history of misconduct regarding his
use of force whom officials speculated would continue to misuse force.
The acknowledgement of officer misconduct by arbitrators, and
decisions of those arbitrators to reinstate the officer regardless of that
acknowledgement, are not uncommon. In most cases that overturn officer
discharges, “arbitrators cite mitigating factors favoring reinstatement. In
twenty-nine of the forty-three decisions (67.4%) in which an arbitrator
overturned a discharge, the arbitrator cited mitigating factors unrelated to
whether the officer was guilty of the alleged offense.” 166 Reinstatement of
officers, despite misconduct, for reasons that have nothing to do with that
misconduct is unambiguously counter to any degree of law enforcement
accountability. A good work record, acceptance of responsibility for the
actions, and honesty of the officer through the disciplinary process should
not be enough to justify reinstating officers for serious or continuous
misconduct. 167
For example, an officer was discharged in a 2013 case for sexually
harassing another officer. The arbitrator concluded that the
discharged officer’s conduct “was pervasive enough to create a
hostile work environment and did constitute harassment.” The
arbitrator nonetheless overturned the discharge in light of the
officer’s “willingness to accept blame for his actions.” Of
particular importance to the arbitrator was the officer’s “general
truthfulness about his culpability.” 168
The ability of arbitrators to acknowledge misconduct but disregard that
acknowledgment, and the facts it is based on, in favor of their own subjective
opinions regarding the officer, and reinstate the officer based on those
subjective opinions is not only problematic from a logical perspective but
also largely unrectifiable.
Arbitrators are insulated from public accountability and are shown an
almost unimaginable degree of deference from courts when their decisions
are challenged. 169 While this may be a workable standard for general
arbitration, it is not for arbitration regarding the employment of law
enforcement officers who have committed misconduct. The nature of law
enforcement as a position of power within our society demands greater
public oversight, specifically when it comes to officer discipline. 170 Officers
Adams, supra note 13, at 146. The statistics used in Adams’ work are based off “ninetytwo arbitration awards published between 2011 and 2015 regarding police officers discharged
for misconduct. Nearly all of these decisions came from Bloomberg Law’s Labor and
Employment Law Resource Center.” Id. at 139. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 146–52.
Id. at 150. (footnotes omitted).
See Fegley, supra note 155.
See generally supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
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should not be able to avoid accountability for their misconduct based on the
subjective standards and opinions of an individual with no accountability to
the public that is directly affected by their decision. In addressing this need
for greater oversight, there are two predominant solutions: the
democratizing reform of discipline procedures for law enforcement, and the
broadening of the public policy exception to allow courts a more robust
ability to regulate arbitrator decisions regarding law enforcement.

B. Democratizing the Discipline of Law Enforcement
Arbitration is, in many ways, incompatible with police accountability
and a constant obstacle to police oversight. 171 Accordingly, some have
proposed that “to the extent that communities want to promote democratic
oversight of police behavior, policymakers could replace arbitrators with
democratically accountable actors.” 172 Effectively, this solution replaces
arbitration with a separate, more democratic, process. In his work on this
issue, Stephen Rushin notes that while police undoubtedly need protections
from unnecessary discipline, arbitration and the larger police disciplinary
process effectively serve as an obstacle to officer accountability. 173 While the
individual procedures that allow officers to appeal disciplinary action against
them may be defensible, they “could theoretically combine to create a
formidable barrier to accountability.” 174 Democratic participation is a
necessary, but largely absent, part of the police disciplinary process that
could serve to balance the necessary protections for officers with the
assurance that those protections do not constitute an obstacle to necessary
oversight and discipline. 175
The most effective solution to this issue, as argued by Rushin, is to
171
172

See Lee supra note 154; Rushin, supra note 7, at 576–78.
Rushin, supra note 7, at 553. Rushin explains that “[a] number of police departments

already do this, by providing officers with an opportunity to appeal discipline levied by a
police supervisor to civilian review boards, city councils, mayors, or city managers.” Id.
Id. at 588 (“Police need basic procedural protections against arbitrary and capricious
punishment. This includes the ability to appeal disciplinary action. At the same time, these
appellate procedures should not allow officers to circumvent democratic oversight or
otherwise thwart reasonable accountability efforts. This Article shows that virtually all police
departments give officers multiple layers of appellate review, often culminating in binding
arbitration. In most cases, the police union has some substantial role in selecting the identity
of the arbitrator. And in most of these cases, the arbitrator is given expansive authority to
relitigate all decisions made by police supervisors, city officials, and civilian review boards.”).
Id. (“These procedural protections may be problematic to the extent that they limit the
ability of supervisors to punish or terminate problematic officers responsible for misconduct.
Additionally, these protections may be troubling because they limit the role of the public in
overseeing local law enforcement.”).
See id. at 589 (“Regardless of where experts fall in this debate, there is nearly uniform
agreement that the development of police policies and officer oversight should not be
divorced from community input. . . . The data presented in this Article suggests that the
disciplinary appeals process in many departments is largely devoid of democratic
participation.” (footnotes omitted)).
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eliminate the arbitration of police disciplinary appeals entirely. 176 However,
Rushin also acknowledges that this solution is a controversial one. 177 While
this solution would allow internal disciplinary responses to reflect
community values more accurately by placing the review authority currently
held by arbitrators with a more democratically accountable actor, the
controversy of this solution may impede its application. 178
A potentially less controversial solution proposed by Rushin is making
appellate arbitrations advisory or providing some opportunity for city
leaders to overturn particularly egregious arbitrator decisions. 179 By
removing the “binding” nature of arbitration decisions regarding police
discipline, city leaders would “maintain the flexibility to depart from
decisions made by an arbitrator when it appears to run counter to the
public’s interest.” 180 Essentially, this would function as a legislative public
policy exception while circumventing the limitations of the public policy
exception within the court system. A modification of this idea is already
utilized in Oceanside, California, where arbitration decisions are binding for
minor disciplinary actions but advisory for more serious misconduct. 181
Alternatively, communities can limit the scope of an arbitrator’s
review. 182 These limitations could take a variety of forms, including limiting
the authority of an arbitrator to overrule or modify punishments to apply in
only a few specific circumstances. 183 This would allow communities to
“maintain the use of arbitration while preventing these appellate procedures
from entirely displacing the role of police leaders, city leaders, and civilian

176
177
178

Id.
Id.
See id. at 589–90 (noting that this solution is already in place in some communities such

as Fountain Valley, California and Lincoln, Nebraska).
Id. at 590–91 (noting this solution is already utilized in some cities such as Peoria, Arizona,
and many cities in California, including Buena Park, Burbank, Cathedral City, Costa Mesa,
Delano, Fullerton, Indio, Ontario, Oxnard, and Pasadena).
Id. at 591.
Id. (“There, the city’s police union contract permits officers to appeal relatively minor
disciplinary action to binding arbitration. But the contract makes arbitration decisions merely
advisory for serious misconduct resulting in suspensions and terminations. Such a
compromise would allow cities to maintain the use of arbitration so as to avoid unfair
punishments in some cases, while maintaining the ability of city officials to protect the public
interest in police accountability in cases of serious misconduct where the continued
employment of the officer could pose a public safety risk.” (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 591–92.
Id. at 592 (“For example, Fullerton, California permits advisory arbitration on appeal, but
bars an arbitrator from overruling or modifying punishment handed down against an officer
unless the arbitrator finds the punishment to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or
otherwise unreasonable. . . .’ Alternatively, communities could limit arbitrators from altering
punishment in cases where the facts support a finding of guilt. This is the case in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, where an arbitrator on appeal can overturn a decision made by the city,
but cannot reduce punishment in cases where there is evidence to support the allegation of
misconduct.” (footnotes omitted)).
179
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review boards.” 184
While these proposed solutions all have their pros and cons, they
share an overarching commonality: they are all legislative solutions. Courts,
in accordance with the separation of powers, do not have the authority to
implement or require the legislature to enact these kinds of solutions.
Considering the extreme divisiveness and polarization in our current
political discourse, especially on the subject of law enforcement, a legislative
solution to this issue is unlikely. Accordingly, we must look to other
potential sources for a solution that is not reliant on the legislature. There,
we find the common law development of the public policy exception and
the ability of courts to guide that development and its application.

C. Broadening the Application of the Public Policy Exception
The application of the public policy exception is not consistent from
state to state. 185 Rather, the application of the exception exists on a
continuum, with the courts of some states being unreceptive to public policy
arguments, others being slightly receptive, and still others being most
receptive to such claims. 186 This means that, while the public policy
exception itself originates from the same source, various jurisdictions have
developed that exception in different ways while still maintaining the same
overall standards under the applicable Supreme Court decisions. This fluid
development not only allows a single jurisdiction to continuously construct
its own approach to the exception, but also allows that jurisdiction to analyze
the positives and negatives of the unique approaches of other jurisdictions
as it develops its own approach to the exception. In this, it is useful to
determine where Minnesota currently falls on this continuum and what
jurisdictions we may take guidance from in reforming our approach to the
public policy exception.

1. Pennsylvania’s Approach
Pennsylvania is recognized as an “example of case law expansion of
statutory language so as to effectively bar almost any public policy
exception.” 187 Pennsylvania’s case law has expanded on the statutory
language of the Pennsylvania legislature’s Act 111, 188 which, among other
things, prohibited the appeal of arbitration decisions regarding the
formation of collective bargaining agreements with police officers and
184

Id.

Iris, supra note 36, at 559.
Id. Pennsylvania and Texas are provided as states that are the least receptive to these
claims; Nebraska is provided as a state that is beginning to open the door to such claims; and
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Connecticut are provided as states that are increasingly more
receptive to public policy exception claims. Id.
185
186

187

Id.

188

43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 70).
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firefighters. 189 And, despite the statute’s general silence on the issue of
individual disciplinary-related grievances, Pennsylvania’s case law history
shows that courts have expanded the coverage of Act 111. 190 In addressing
this general silence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
Act 111 specifically avoids the use of the courts for dispute
resolution. This policy is so strong that section seven of the
Act, 43 P.S. 217.7, provides for binding arbitration and contains
the unique provision that “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be allowed
to any court.” Thus the only method for settling grievance
disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.
This objective would be completely frustrated if we were to
superimpose, by judicial fiat, a layer of court intervention. 191
In accordance with this opinion, “Pennsylvania courts have
consistently interpreted Article 111 to constrict their ability to intervene and
disturb an arbitration award.” 192 Later decisions, such as the case of James
Betancourt, clarified and articulated the focused scope of judicial review of
arbitrator awards. 193 While Pennsylvania does recognize the general
contractual standard that courts may not enforce an order that would
“compel a party to commit an illegal act,” this additional exception is
“virtually useless” in addressing instances of police misconduct. 194
Ultimately, Pennsylvania’s application of the public policy exception stands
as one of the most restrictive approaches to the exception.

Iris, supra note 36, at 559–60 (“This Act afforded police officers and firefighters in that
state the right to engage in collective bargaining. The Act went on to outline the process to
be followed when there is an impasse in reaching a collective bargaining agreement. The
process requires a three member arbitration panel. The panel’s decision is binding, the Act
stating (relative to any such decisions): ‘No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.’”).
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561 (quoting Chirico v. Bd. of Supervisors for Newton Twp., 470 A.2d 470, 475 (Pa.
1983)).
189

190
191

192
193

Id.
Id. (“[T]he narrow certiorari scope of review limits courts to reviewing questions

concerning (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an
excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights.” (quoting Pa.
State Police v. Pa. State Troopers’ Ass’n, 656 A.2d 83, 89–90 (Pa. 1995)). See generally Pa.
State Police v. Pa. State Troopers’ Ass’n, 633 A.2d 1278 (Pa. 1993) (This is the case
commonly referenced as The Betancourt Case involving Trooper James Betancourt).
Iris, supra note 36, at 562–63 (“This escape valve, articulated in the context of a challenge
to a non-disciplinary arbitration proceeding, is, however, virtually useless in addressing even
the most egregious, factually uncontested instances of police misconduct.”) Supporting this
assertion with a discussion of Trooper Rodney Smith who, “while off duty and intoxicated,
accosted his ex-girlfriend, threatened her, and placed his loaded police issued firearm in her
mouth. He pled guilty to five criminal charges, including three counts of driving under the
influence, simple assault, and making terroristic threats. Nonetheless, the arbitrator
concluded this misconduct was not serious enough to warrant discharge.” Id.
194
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2. Nebraska’s Approach
Nebraska presents a different approach than Pennsylvania. Developed
recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court first addressed the public policy
exception issue in 2009. 195 Like Pennsylvania, there was a general silence in
the statutory law regarding this question, so the court was, largely, creating
the Nebraska precedent regarding the public policy exception in this single
case. 196 While the court essentially deferred to the general state and federal
approach in favor of arbitration “as a desirable alternative to court
litigation,” it also “clearly indicated such preference has its limits.” 197

3. Connecticut’s Approach
On the opposite end of the spectrum from Pennsylvania, with
Nebraska situated somewhere in the middle, sits Connecticut. Interestingly,
“[t]he wording of the pertinent statue in Connecticut is no more inviting of
judicial intervention on public policy grounds than are its equivalents in
other states.” 198 Like other jurisdictions, Connecticut statutory law is silent as
to a court vacating an arbitration award that would require a party to commit
an illegal act. 199 However, despite the similarly narrow scope of the statutory
grounds for vacating arbitration awards compared to other, more restrictive
jurisdictions, Connecticut courts “have not been reluctant to set aside
arbitration decisions, in cases involving both police officers and other public
Id. at 569. See generally State v. Henderson, 762 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2009) (This is the case
referenced by the material).
Iris, supra note 36, at 570–71.
Id. at 571; see Henderson, 762 N.W.2d at 18 (“Although arbitration decisions are given
great deference, they are not sacrosanct. Here we cannot say that the strong public policy
favoring arbitration should trump the explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy that
laws should be enforced without racial or religious discrimination, and the public should
reasonably perceive this to be so. Having associated himself with the Ku Klux
Klan, Henderson's return to duty would involuntarily associate the State Patrol with the Ku
Klux Klan and severely undermine public confidence in the fairness of law enforcement and
the law itself. Therefore, we conclude that the arbitrator's decision reinstating Henderson to
the Nebraska State Patrol violates Nebraska public policy and that the district court correctly
refused to enforce the award. Henderson and SLEBC's assignment of error lacks merit.”
(footnote omitted)).
Iris, supra note 36, at 585 (noting the Connecticut statute allows the vacation of arbitration
awards: “(1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) if
there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the
arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in requesting to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”). This
language is similar to both the federal and Minnesota statutory standards for overturning
arbitrator awards. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-418 (West 2013), with 9 U.S.C. §
10 (2002), and MINN. STAT. § 572B.23 (2020).
Iris, supra note 36, at 585.
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employees.” 200
As the basis for this more liberal application of the public policy
exception, Connecticut courts have relied heavily on the precedent of
Schoonmaker v. Cummings and Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C. 201 While
there are “examples of court reversals of arbitration decisions which predate
the Schoonmaker case; this precedent clearly gave lower Connecticut courts
substantially more latitude in addressing public policy challenges.” 202 This
larger latitude regarding the public policy exception can be seen in action in
one particular example:
In a field related to police work, Connecticut courts have issued
a number of decisions affirming reversal of arbitration decisions
reinstating discharged state corrections officers. One officer was
discharged for leaving an obscene, racist, phone voice mail to a
state senator, making the call from work, on a state telephone,
while on duty. The arbitration decisions reduced the penalty to a
sixty days’ suspension. The trial court vacated the arbitration
award; the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed that
decision. 203
In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted the
proper evaluation set forth by the trial court, presenting a
straightforward breakdown of the appropriate approach to public
policy exception application under Connecticut’s precedent.
Here, the trial court set forth the “two-step analysis ... often
employed [in] deciding cases such as this. First, the court
determines whether an explicit, well-defined and dominant
public policy can be identified. If so, the court then decides if the
arbitrator's award violated the public policy.” The trial court
200
201

Id.
Id.; Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Conn., P.C., 747 A.2d 1017, 1024–25

(Conn. 2000) (“Although we recognize the important role that arbitration plays in settling
private disputes, we take this opportunity to articulate expressly the role of the judiciary in
reviewing public policy challenges to consensual arbitration awards. . . . Although we
previously have held that an arbitral award may be vacated if it is violative of a clear public
policy, we have never expressly articulated the proper standard, de novo or otherwise, for
reviewing whether an arbitral decision does in fact violate public policy. Until now, our role
in addressing a public policy challenge has been confined largely to determining whether, as
gleaned from a statute, administrative decision or case law, there exists a public policy
mandate with which an arbitral award must conform. . . . We conclude that where a party
challenges a consensual arbitral award on the ground that it violates public policy, and where
that challenge has a legitimate, colorable basis, de novo review of the award is appropriate in
order to determine whether the award does in fact violate public policy.” (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted)).
Iris, supra note 36, at 586.
Id. at 587.
202
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determined that [the officer’s] act of placing an anonymous,
obscene and racist telephone call while on duty in
a state correction facility, from a state owned telephone, was a
violation of explicit public policy. This public policy is articulated
in both § 53a–183, the offense for which Frederick was given
accelerated rehabilitation, and the relevant regulations of the
department of correction. We agree with the trial court that an
explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy is identified
here, wherein a state employee, while on duty, utilized
a state owned telephone to place an anonymous, obscene and
racist call. Accordingly, the first prong of the required inquiry is
satisfied.
The trial court then proceeded to the second prong of the
analysis: whether the arbitrator's award violated this clear public
policy. The court noted that the arbitrator attempted to excuse
Frederick's conduct “as the outgrowth of various personal
stressors,” but did “[find] that he did, in fact, leave the stipulated
message for the legislator.” Accordingly, the arbitrator justified
reinstating Frederick despite his conduct, which violated both
statute and department regulations. We agree with the trial court
that, in doing so, the arbitrator “minimize[d] society’s overriding
interest in preventing conduct such as that at issue in this case
from occurring.” Thus, the award—with its inherent
rationalization of conduct stipulated to by Frederick, which was
violative of statute and regulations—is in itself violative of clear
public policy. 204

In comparing the Connecticut approach to less receptive approaches,
such as Pennsylvania’s, it is important to recognize that these approaches
are developed entirely through case law. 205 The Connecticut statute is “no
more inviting of a public policy claim” than other jurisdictions with more
restrictive approaches; “[t]he crucial difference is how courts interpret that
statutory wording.” 206

4. Minnesota’s Place on the Continuum
On the same continuum, Minnesota most likely falls somewhere
around the recently developed standard in Nebraska. Similar to Nebraska,
Minnesota courts have expressed an approach that favors arbitration and
constitutes significant deference to the decisions reached in arbitration,
citing to federal cases such as W.R. Grace and Misco to support this
204
205
206

State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Loc. 387, AFL-CIO, 747 A.2d 480, 486 (Conn. 2000).
Iris, supra note 36, at 590.

Id.
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approach. 207 However, like Nebraska, Minnesota courts have inferred the
possibility that this favorable approach has its limitations. 208 While not as
restrictive in the application of the public policy exception as states such as
Pennsylvania, 209 Minnesota courts are inarguably more restrictive than
jurisdictions such as Connecticut. 210 Therefore, it is most appropriate to
place Minnesota, currently, somewhere around the middle of the
continuum. The middle of the continuum, however, is not sufficient to
establish the necessary protections and oversight over the arbitration process
when dealing with issues of police discipline. 211 To provide the necessary
protections and oversight, the application of the public policy exception
must be reformed in light of the more liberal application of the exception
in jurisdictions like Connecticut.

5. Reforming Minnesota’s Application of the Public Policy
Exception
Minnesota courts must focus on the conduct of the individual involved
in the arbitration, rather than the arbitrator’s award, when determining
whether public policy has been violated to truly represent the public interest
in applying the public policy exception. As noted previously, the application
of the public policy exception is developed entirely through case law. 212
Interpretation of similar statutory principles is what differentiates the
restrictive applications of this exception from the more liberal
applications. 213 Accordingly, reforming the jurisdictional application of this
exception does not require legislative intervention and can be pursued
purely through court decisions regarding the interpretation and application
of statutory principles on the limitations of overturning arbitrator awards. In
other words, the only thing hindering the reformation of the application of
the public policy exception in Minnesota to a more workable solution that
truly serves the public interest is the deference to the historical approach of
Minnesota courts—an approach that does not account for the inherent
207
208
209

See supra Part III.D.
See supra text accompanying note 67–68.
Compare Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers’ Ass'n, 741 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999), with

City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the Pennsylvania court’s decision to uphold the arbitrator’s award reinstating
the officer in that case, it is unlikely it would have applied the public policy exception as the
Minnesota court did in the Brooklyn Center case if faced with similar circumstances).
Compare State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Loc. 387, AFL-CIO, 747 A.2d 480, 485 (Conn.
2000), with City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Union, Loc. No. 807, No. A19-0404, 2019 WL
4165031 (Minn. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2019).
See supra Part IV.B (recognizing that Minnesota’s place on the middle of the public policy
exception application continuum has required courts to uphold arbitration awards reinstating
officers whose conduct is not compatible with the public interest). See, e.g., City of Duluth,
2019 WL 4165031.
See supra text accompanying note 205.
See supra text accompanying note 206.
210

211

212
213

369

370

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:1

differences between general arbitration and arbitration regarding police
misconduct. 214
In broadening Minnesota’s application of the public policy exception
to allow for the necessary degree of oversight over arbitrator decisions
regarding law enforcement discipline, 215 the two-step analysis presented by
the Connecticut courts provides the most straightforward and applicable
standard of application. That two-step analysis can be broken down as
follows: (1) whether there is an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public
policy involved; and (2) whether the arbitrator’s award violates that policy. 216
While this may not seem so different than the Minnesota standard, the
inherent differences between the approaches rest in their application.
Minnesota’s approach has emphasized the arbitrator’s decision
specifically, rather than the conduct of the individual, when analyzing the
potential application of the public policy exception. 217 In contrast to
Minnesota, Connecticut courts have looked to the conduct of the individual
to determine if there is a public policy involved. 218 If it is determined that
there is a public policy involved based on that conduct, the arbitrator’s
award is then analyzed to determine whether that award violates that
policy. 219 The award’s violation, however, does not necessarily need to be an
explicit violation of the policy itself, according to the language of the court;
it is more a question of whether it violates the public’s interest in that
policy. 220 Accordingly, a practical standard for Minnesota courts to apply,
reflective of the application of the Connecticut standard, is: (1) whether
there is an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy involved; and
(2) whether the arbitrator’s award violates the public’s interest in that policy.
This standard maintains the emphasis of Minnesota court precedent that
there be an explicit and well-defined public policy involved, while
simultaneously allowing for a more liberal application of that standard in
determining whether, in the case of an officer discharged for misconduct
but reinstated through arbitration, the arbitrator’s reinstatement of that
officer is a violation of the public’s “overriding interest in preventing conduct
such as that at issue . . . from occurring.” 221

214
215
216
217
218
219
220

See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra text accompanying note 204.
See supra text accompanying note 70.
See supra text accompanying note 204.
Id.
Id. (“Accordingly, the arbitrator justified reinstating Frederick despite his conduct, which

violated both statute and department regulations. We agree with the trial court that, in doing
so, the arbitrator ‘minimize[d] society's overriding interest in preventing conduct such as that
at issue in this case from occurring.’ Thus, the award—with its inherent rationalization of
conduct stipulated to by Frederick, which was violative of statute and regulations—is in itself
violative of clear public policy.”) (emphasis added).
221

See id.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration is not an inherently problematic method of dispute
resolution. 222 However, the current use of arbitration in disputes regarding
police misconduct and subsequent discipline constitutes an unacceptable
obstacle to officer accountability and the ability of officials to regulate the
conduct of their officers. 223 The incredible authority provided to arbitrators
in making decisions in these disputes, the insulation from public
accountability, and the deference courts provide to those decisions combine
to create a system that favors individual officers over the interests of the
communities they are meant to serve. These standards, while workable in
general arbitration, become fundamentally unworkable when applied to the
intrinsically different circumstances of police discipline. While there are
potential legislative solutions to the problematic use of arbitration regarding
police discipline, 224 courts should not sit on their hands and wait for a
solution that may never come.
The public policy exception is an accepted standard for overturning
arbitrator awards that are counter to public policy. 225 This standard narrowly
applied, however, does not function to truly serve the public interest. 226 A
more robust application of this standard allows for the continued use of
arbitration in police disciplinary proceedings but simultaneously provides
greater oversight regarding the decisions of those arbitrators, allowing courts
to ensure that those decisions do not contradict the public interest in
regulating the conduct of law enforcement officers. 227 Without this reformed
approach, the public will bear a continuous risk of harm at the hands of
officers discharged for violent or inappropriate misconduct but reinstated
based on the subjective opinion of an unaccountable actor.

222
223
224
225
226
227

See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part V.C.1; see, e.g., Iris, supra note 36, at 562–63.
See supra Part V.C.5.
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